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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: Goss v. Lopez: Much
Ado About Nothing or The Tempest
INTRODUCTION

On January 22, 1975, the Supreme Court ruled in Goss v. Lopez'
that except in situations where the student's presence "poses a continuing danger to persons or property or an ongoing threat of disrupting the academic process," 2 a school could not temporarily suspend a student without affording him "some kind of notice and...
some kind of hearing." 3 Goss is the first student suspension case the
Supreme Court has taken.' As such, it joins the small number of
cases in which the Court has been willing to abandon its traditional
1. 419 U.S. 565 (1975). For other discussions of the case, see Note, Student Rights Under
the Due Process Clause... Suspensions from Public Schools, 8 AKRON L. REV. 570 (1975)
[hereinafter cited as Student Rights]; Note, Fourteenth Amendment-Students Facing Suspension Have Property and Liberty Interests That Qualify for Due Process Protection, 3 FLA.
ST. U. L. REV. 301 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Suspension]; Note, Due Process for Students
- New Developments, 43 FORDHAM L. REV. 1011 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Developments];
Note, Due Process - Students May Not Be Suspended Without PriorNotice of the Charges
and an Opportunity for a Hearing, 6 SETON HALL L. REV. 568 (1975) [hereinafter cited as
Hearing]; Note, Due Process for Washington Public School Students, 50 WASH. L. REV. 675
(1975) [hereinafter cited as Washington Students].
2. 419 U.S. at 582.
3. Id. at 579.
4. For a discussion of suspension cases preceding Goss, see Note, ProceduralDue Process
and Short Suspensions from the Public Schools: Prologue to Goss v. Lopez, 50 NOTRE DAME
LAW. 364 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Prologue]; Flygare, Short-Term Student Suspensions
and the Requirements of Due Process, 3 J. LAW-ED. 529, 542-52 (1974) [hereinafter cited as
Flygare].
The number of suspensions which occur each year is significant. See Goss v. Lopez, 419
U.S. 565, 592 n.10 (Powell, J., dissenting). The statistics for Evanston Township High School,
a school with about 5000 students, are set out below.
ETHS SUSPENSIONS, 1973-74
Total number of suspensions ....
................................
Total num ber of students suspended .......................................
Total number of students suspended more than once
Reason for Suspension (3 schools)**
Hall violations and/or unauthorized
absence from the building
Gambling
Smoking
Drug abuse (incl. alcohol)
Defiance of authority
Fighting
Verbal abuse
Excessive tardiness
Theft
Threats
Miscellaneous (assault, extortion,
disruption of class, et al)

...........

. ..........
..
...

1217*
711
268

Number

No. of Students Suspended
More than Once/same offense

626
8
149
24
76
59
26
10
11
11

142
2
19
2
17
9
2
2
1
1

45

0
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role of non-interference in school affairs.5
The purpose of this article is fourfold: to review Goss for its effect
on future due process adjudication; to examine the procedures required by Goss for their potential impact on school officials and
students; to consider recent cases citing Goss to see whether the
fears of the Goss dissenters have materialized; and to consider
briefly the impact of Goss on Illinois schools.
FACTS
In 1971 students in various Columbus, Ohio, public schools
clashed with school administrators over which community leaders
should speak at school assemblies during Black History Week.' Disturbances followed, then mass suspensions. The nine named plaintiffs were among students suspended for periods of up to ten days
pursuant to an Ohio statute which authorized principals to impose
suspensions without notice or a hearing. 7 None of the students was
given a hearing although in some cases the school offered the
opportunity for a parent-student-administrator conference at a later
date to discuss the student's educational future." The involvement
of individuals varied; at least one student claimed to have been an
*This number does not include instances of "inside suspension," which action confines the
student to a restricted area for all or a portion of a school day; no systemic records are kept
for "inside suspension."
**The tabulation excludes one school in which statistics were not maintained in this
particular form.
Evanston Township High School Report of the Committee on Student Suspension,
December, 1974.
5. See Student Rights, supra note 1, at 571-73; See also Hearing, supra note 1, at 584-85,
in which the author sugests that Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School Dist.,
393 U.S. 503 (1969), Goss, and Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308 (1975) can be viewed as a
trilogy of progressive decisions which extend constitutional rights to students.
6. NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF SECONDARY SCHOOL PRINCIPALS, A LEGAL MEMORANDUM, JUNE
1975, p. I [hereinafter cited as MEMO].
7. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3313.66 (1974) provides in pertinent part:
The superintendent of schools of a city . . . , the executive head of a local school
district, or the principal of a public school may suspend a pupil from school for not
more than ten days. Such superintendent or executive head may expel a pupil from
school. Such superintendent, executive head, or principal shall within twenty-four
hours after the time of expulsion or suspension, notify the parent or guardian of the
child, and the clerk of the board of education in writing of such expulsion or
suspension including the reasons therefor. The pupil or the parent, or guardian, or
custodian of a pupil so expelled may appeal such action to the board of education
at any meeting of the board and shall be permitted to be heard against the expulsion.
Thus, although under the statute an expelled student could appeal the decision, a suspended
student had no right to appeal a principal's decision to suspend. Neither student had a right
to a prior hearing. Compare ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 122, § 10-22.6 (a) (b), the full text of which is
set out in note 119 infra.
8. 419 U.S. at 570.
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innocent bystander; another had been suspended immediately after
assaulting a police officer.'
The students brought suit in the federal district court under 42
U.S.C. § 1983,10 asking both declaratory and injunctive relief." The
three judge court," having found education a protected interest,'3
ruled that since no hearing had been provided the students, either
prior to suspension or within a reasonable time thereafter, they had
been denied due process. The defendant school administrators appealed;' 4 the Supreme Court affirmed.
MAJORITY OPINION

Justice White's opinion, in which Justice Douglas, Brennan,
Stewart and Marshall joined, first confronted appellants' contention that since students had no constitutional right to education at
public expense,' 5 the due process clause was not at issue. The majority found this position erroneous. Using the due process analysis
9. Id.
10. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970) provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of
the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation
of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall
be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper
proceeding for redress.
11. The students asked for a declaration that the Ohio statute was unconstitutional in
allowing public administrators to deprive them of their right to an education without due
process. Further, they asked that school officials be enjoined from imposing suspensions
pursuant to the statute and that references to their suspensions be removed from their
records. 419 U.S. at 568-69.
12. The three judge court was convened pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2281 (1970).
13. 372 F. Supp. 1279, 1300 (S.D. Ohio 1973). Judge Kinneary found a liberty interest in
the "[sitate created entitlement to an education." He seems to have confused a property
interest with a liberty interest. See note 18 infra.
14. 28 U.S.C. § 1253 (1970) provides:
Except as otherwise provided by law, any party may appeal to the Supreme Court
from an order granting or denying, after notice and hearing, an interlocutory or
permanent injunction in any civil action, suit or proceeding required by any Act of
Congress to be heard and determined by a district court of three judges.
15. Prior to 1973 courts seem to have assumed education was a protected right. See, e.g.,
Ordway v. Hargraves, 323 F. Supp. 1155, 1158 (D. Mass. 1971) ("[Elducation is a basic
personal right or liberty."). See also, Williams v. Dade County School Bd., 441 F.2d 299, 302
(5th Cir. 1971); Dixon v. Alabama State Bd. of Educ., 294 F.2d 150, 157 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 368 U.S. 930 (1961); Sullivan v. Houston Independent School Dist., 333 F. Supp.
1149, 1172 (S.D. Tex. 1971). However, the Supreme Court's decision in San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973), which held education is not a constitutionally guaranteed fundamental right, required the district court in Goss to distinguish between
fundamental rights and interests protected by due process. Prologue, supra note 4, at 372.
Even the dissent in Goss recognized that Rodriguez was not dispositive of the issues. 419 U.S.
at 586.
Although a public school pupil's interest in education will be protected by the due process
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enunciated by Justice Stewart in Board of Regents v. Roth,'6 the
Court found that on the basis of the Ohio statutes, which granted
free education to residents five to twenty-one years old and compelled attendance, 7 the students' entitlement to a public education
constituted a property interest. 8 Furthermore, the damage caused
a student's reputation if the misconduct charges and suspension
were recorded in student files could adversely affect his standing in
the school community and interfere with future education and employment opportunities. Thus, the Court reasoned, not only had the
students' property interests been infringed, but also their liberty
interests."
The school administrators' alternative argument was that even if
the student's right to education constituted a protected interest, the
loss of ten days was "neither severe nor grievous,"20 and thus the due
process clause did not apply. The suggestion that a grievous loss to
the protected interest must be inflicted before the due process
clause applies was refuted by the first step of the Roth analysis:
"[wie must look not to the 'weight' but to the nature of the interest
at stake."'" Since the Court did not consider a ten day suspension
de minimis,22 a student's property and liberty interests could not be
denied without due process.
Having determined that the students' interests entitled them to
due process protection, the Court considered the second step stated
in Roth: what due process protection is required? This step involved
clause, private and parochial school students are unlikely to benefit from the Goss decision
since the fourteenth amendment applies only when there is state action. See Student Rights,
supra note 1, at 570 n.5.
16. 408 U.S. 564 (1972). For further discussion, see text accompanying notes 39 through
59 supra.
17. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3313.48 (1974); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3313.64 (1974); and
OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 3321.04 (1974).
18. 419 U.S. at 573-74. The Roth court defined a property interest as one created not by
the Constitution but by an independent source, such as state law. To have a property interest,
one must have "a legitimate claim of entitlement to it." 408 U.S. at 577. See generally Reich,
The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733 (1964). See also Hearing, supra note 1, at 571-74.
19. 419 U.S. at 574-75. The liberty interest of a student involves
"the right to ...
acquire useful knowledge" .. , an interest in one's "good name,
reputation, honor or integrity;" . .. [and an] interest in being free of a "stigma
or other disability" imposed by the state.
Flygare, supra note 4, at 533.
A student's liberty interest could be crucial in a state where no property interest has been
created by statute. See Student Rights, supra note 1, at 579.
20. 419 U.S. at 575. This argument is based on previous cases which held the due process
clause applies only when the infringement of a protected interest is "severe," "grievous,"
"serious," "important," or "significant." See 419 U.S. at 588 (Powell, J., dissenting).
21. 419 U.S. at 575-76, quoting Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 570-71 (1972).
22. 419 U.S. at 576.
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balancing the interests of the student in avoiding "unfair or mistaken exclusion from the educational process, with all of its unfortunate consequences"2 3 against the school's need for discipline and
order so that it could perform its educational function. The Court
contended that schools could operate efficiently and still provide
some due process protection to students. Thus, it held that for suspensions of ten days or less, the school must give oral or written
notice to the student of the charges against him; explain the evidence behind the charges, if the student denies them; and give the
student a chance to explain his side of the story. The Court did
recognize that in some situations an immediate removal of the student from school would be necessary, 5 but stated that generally
"notice and hearing should precede removal . ''6
THE DISSENT

Justice Powell's dissent also followed the two-step analysis of
Roth, but arrived at different conclusions. In examining the students' statutory entitlement to education, Justice Powell emphasized that property interests "are created and their dimensions are
defined by existing rules or understandings that stem from an indpendent source such as state law."" Since the Ohio statute which
created the student's property right also defined its dimensions by
giving the principal power to suspend students, the right was not
unqualified. Thus, the dissent reasoned, the Ohio legislature had
made the student's right and the principal's right inseparable. To
ignore the limitation placed upon the student's right was to disre28
gard the clear intent of the legislature.
Regardless of how one defined the student's property interest, the
dissenters thought any infringement of it by a ten day suspension
23. Id. at 579.
24. Id. at 581. The prejudicial effect of the potential accuser being the administrator who
holds the conference with the student was not considered by the Court. See Suspension, supra
note 1, at 308.
25. See text accompanying note 2 supra.
26. 419 U.S. at 582. However, the Court made clear that it was not requiringthat a
student be given a full trial-type procedure with the right to counsel, to confront and crossexamine witnesses, or to call his own witnesses for verification of his story. 419 U.S. at 583.
For suspensions longer than ten days, expulsions or "unusual situations," the Court stated
it would require "more than the rudimentary procedures." 419 U.S. at 584. For a discussion
of what procedures might be required in these latter situations, see Developments, supra note
1, at 1019-25.
27. 419 U.S. at 586, quoting Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577.
28. 419 U.S. at 587 n.4. See Hearing,supra note 1, at 583, where the author suggests that
the Court, by adopting the Roth two-part test, may have "strait-jacketed itself with an
approach that generates the kinds of artificial formalisms which characterized the rightprivilege distinction."
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did not constitute a "grievous loss."29 The fact that the studentappellees' grades had not suffered from their ten day absence indicated there had been no serious deprivation of the students' entitle30
ment to education.
In considering the students' liberty interest, Justice Powell was
concerned with the lack of proof of damage, as it applied to appellees. Since the Court had found in Roth that a "nontenured teacher
who is not rehired by a public university could not claim to suffer
sufficient reputational injury to require constitutional protections,"'" the dissent found "untenable" the students' argument that
a ten day suspension seriously damaged their reputations.2
Justice Powell's treatment of the second step in due process analysis, the balancing of interests, differed sharply from the majority's.
Rather than the adversary relationship between student and school
which the majority described, he stressed the "commonality of interest of the State and pupils in the public school system. '3 Since
the State's interest lay in maintaining an orderly atmosphere so
that the schools could function properly and thus benefit all pupils
and since the student's interest lay in obtaining an education, part
of which includes an understanding of the necessity for discipline
in one's life, the two interests were not "incompatible."3' 4 The dissent viewed the majority's requirement of due process for suspended
students as an extensive interference with the State's interest. The
chance of a student's interest being infringed by mistaken or unfair
discipline was minor and easily rectifiable by informal means.
As well as finding the Court's decision an unnecessary and "unprecedented intrusion into the process of elementary and secondary
education, '35 Justice Powell viewed with alarm the "new 'thicket'
the Court now enters. 36 If, he reasoned, a brief37 suspension causes
29. 419 U.S. at 588. Although Justice Powell did not believe the de minimis standard
proper in this case, id. at 588 n. 5, he appears to be arguing, as appellants did, that any harm
done is inconsequential and thus will not trigger due process protection. See the discussion
of "The De Minimis Harm Hurdle" in Flygare, supra note 4, at 538-39.
30. 419 U.S. at 589. The district court's finding of facts indicated that among the suspended students the highest cumulative grade point average was 2.5. 372 F. Supp. at 1291.
One observation made by school officials is that usually students who are suspended have
poor academic records. Officials therefore argue that a 1-10 day suspension does not damage
these students' educational opportunities. To argue otherwise is, at best, unrealistic. Interview with Dr. Dorothy Magett, Principal, Evanston Township High School, in Evanston,
Illinois, August 7, 1975.
31. 419 U.S. at 589.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 593.
34. Id. at 592-93.
35. Id. at 585.
36. Id. at 597.
37. The dissent interprets the Court's opinion as disallowing even a one day suspension
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sufficient harm to trigger due process protection, what will happen
when administrators and teachers make such discretionary decisions as to give a student a failing grade, exclude him from extracurricular activities, or place him in a vocational rather than college
preparatory track?
One can only speculate as to the extent to which public education
will be disrupted by giving every school child the power to contest
in court any decision made by his teacher which arguably infringes
the state-conferred right to education.38
DUE PROCESS ADJUDICATION

Since both the majority and dissenting opinions of the Goss court
purported to rely upon the two-step analytical process announced
in Board of Regents v. Roth, 39 it is important to consider this process
and what impact continued reliance upon it could have. Roth, a
non-tenured teacher at a state university, whose one year contract
was not renewed, claimed inter alia that his due process right had
been infringed by the university's refusal to give him a statement
of reasons for his nonrenewal and to provide him a hearing on the
decision. In reversing the lower courts' decisions for Roth, the Court
made clear that the balancing of interests approach employed by
the district court was appropriate only to determine the second step
in due process adjudication: how much process is due. The threshold question, the first step in the analytical process, must be: is one
of the interests encompassed by the due process clause - life, liberty
or property - involved? If the plaintiff cannot prove he has a protected interest, then the second step is unnecessary since the state
can act summarily. Only when a protected interest is involved is
"the right to some kind of prior hearing . . . paramount."4
There is a basic disagreement between the majority and dissent
in Goss in their approach to the first step of due process adjudication. While both recognize that state laws may create a "legitimate
claim of entitlement" 4 ' to education and thus constitute a property
interest,' they differ on whether deprivation of that interest must
be considered in determining the application of due process. The
majority view, that "deprivation, while another factor to weigh in
determining the appropriate form of hearing, 'is not decisive of the
given without due process protection. Id. at 585 n.3.
38. 419 U.S. at 600 n.22.
39. 408 U.S. 564 (1972). See 419 U.S. at 575-76, 586.
40. 408 U.S. at 570-71.
41. 419 U.S. at 573, 586.
42. For further discussion, see note 18 supra.
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basic right' to a hearing,"4 3 follows recent Court attempts to move
away from the pre-1972 judicial use of interest balancing in a determination of whether due process applies." "As long as a property
deprivation is not de minimis, its gravity is irrelevant."45 It is this
view which the dissenters in Goss were unwilling to follow." They
argued that precedent dictates that the Court look to "the significance of the state-created or state-enforced right and to the substantiality of the alleged deprivation." 7 This position necessitates a
judgment that the deprivation is sufficiently weighty to trigger due
process. To follow this view would return the Court to pre-Roth
interest balancing analysis, a process by which the Court "expanded
the applicability of the due process clause to deprivations of several
types of interests not previously understood as protected by the
right."'" It is this expansion that Roth sought to limit.49
In determining whether a liberty interest has been infringed, it is
0
particularly difficult to ignore the weight of the deprivation. The
dissent in Goss recognized this difficulty when it tried to reconcile
the finding of a student's liberty interest with the Roth decision. In
43. 419 U.S. at 576, quoting in part Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 86 (1972).
44. See Note, Specifying the ProceduresRequired by Due Process: Toward Limits on the
Use of Interest Balancing,88 HARV. L. REV. 1510, 1511-14 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Interest
Balancing].
45. 419 U.S. at 576.
46. As well as disagreeing with the majority about the gravity of the deprivation, Justice
Powell argued that the students' statutory right to education, their property interest, was
limited by the principal's statutory power to suspend. For further discussion, see text accompanying notes 27 and 28 supra. This view seems in conflict with his concurring opinion in
Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 167 (1974):
While the legislature may elect not to confer a property interest in federal employment, it may not constitutionally authorize the deprivation of such an interest, once
conferred, without appropriate procedural safeguards [footnote omitted].
However, as his footnote in Goss makes clear, the difference between the two cases lies in
the seriousness of the deprivation. 419 U.S. at 587 n.4.
47. 419 U.S. at 599-600.
48. Interest Balancing, supra note 44, at 1511 n.5.
49. See Note, "Liberty," "Property," and ProceduralDue Process, 5 CONN. L. REV. 685,
695-97 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Liberty], where the author argues in his analysis of Roth
that the Court's reliance on Slochower v. Bd. of Educ., 350 U.S. 551 (1956), Wieman v.
Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183 (1952), and Connell v. Higginbotham, 403 U.S. 207 (1971), as precedent for illustrating when a teacher has a property interest, was misplaced. Since these cases
dealt with infringement of substantive rights, the issue of whether a property interest existed
was not met. The author's conclusion is that the Court, by relying on these cases, was
attempting to limit interests protected by due process.
50. For a liberty, however, "weight" cannot be entirely excluded from the firstphase analysis. Some valuing is inevitably necessary to determine if a particular
limitation of freedom rises to the level of a fourteenth amendment deprivation of
liberty.
Prologue, supra note 4 at 370.
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Roth the Court, while granting that the meaning of liberty was
broad, found no state infringment of the teacher's liberty interest.
The university has made no "change against him that might seriously damage his standing and associations in his community"'" and
had not imposed on Roth "a stigma or other disability that foreclosed his freedom to take advantage of other employment opportunities. 52 Although the lack of evidence that Roth's academic career might be damaged by nonrenewal of his contract accounted in
part for the adverse decision,53 Justice Stewart indicated that even
proof that future employers would find Roth "somewhat less attractive. . . would hardly establish the kind of foreclosure of opportunities amounting to a deprivation of 'liberty.'
The Goss Court's acceptance of "generalized opinion evidence"5 5
that suspension might cause psychological harm56 and that colleges
and future employers might inquire whether a student had ever
been suspended may lead to a renewed fight by non-tenured teachers to avoid summary dismissals. 7 As one lawyer has noted,
",51

51. 408 U.S. at 573.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 574 n.13.
54. Id. Justice Stewart's citation to Schware v. Bd. of Bar Examiners, 353 U.S. 232 (1957),
implies that only by depriving an individual of the chance to practice his chosen profession
or by denying him a wide field of employment has the state infringed a liberty interest.
Since the teacher in Roth was dismissed with no stated reasons, it is at least arguable that
in a market glutted with teachers, any school or university will refuse to hire a teacher whose
dismissal will be speculated upon by future employers. See Comment, Termination and Due
Process, 2 J. LAW-ED. 305, 308 n.10 (1973); Liberty, supra note 49 at 692-94; TIME, September
22, 1975, at 18 states that one-half of last spring's 300,000 college graduates with teaching
degrees are looking for jobs.
55. 419 U.S. at 597 (Powell, J., dissenting).
56. The psychological harm consisted of the following:
1. The suspension is a blow to the student's self-esteem.
2. The student feels powerless and helpless.
3. The student views school authorities and teachers with resentment, suspicion
and fear.
4. The student learns withdrawal as a mode of problem solving.
5. The student has little perception of the reasons for the suspension. He does not
know what offending acts he committed.
6. The student is stigmatized by his teachers and school administrators as a
deviant. They expect the student to be a troublemaker in the future.
419 U.S. at 598 n.18, quoting Lopez v. Williams, 372 F. Supp. at 1292.
57. The issue of whether a non-tenured teacher has a property or liberty interest protected
by due process has been heavily litigated since Roth and its companion case, Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593 (1972). For a non-tenured teacher to prove a property interest, he must
show that either state rules or regulations or a contractual agreement give him a legitimate
claim of entitlement to his job; or that there exists some well-established "joint understanding amounting to a 'de facto tenure program.'" Simard v Bd. of Educ. of Town of Groton,
473 F.2d 988, 992 (2d Cir. 1973). The usual issue present in cases where a non-tenured teacher
asserts a property interest is whether or not the court finds a de facto tenure. See, e.g., Roane
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"[a]fter Goss, students have more rights than non-tenured
teachers."" s It appears that Goss has done little to clarify what constitutes deprivation of a liberty interest. Inevitably, then, the courts
will continue, despite Supreme Court pronouncements, to weigh the
liberty interest in due process adjudications.59
v. Callisburg Independent School Dist., 511 F.2d 633 (5th Cir. 1975) (common law of institution provided de facto tenure); Cusumano v. Ratchford, 507 F.2d 980, 984 (8th Cir. 1974) (no
property interest found because college regulations were specifically worded to "avoid the de
facto tenure hypothesized in Sindermann"); Hostrop v. Board of Junior College Dist. No. 511,
471 F.2d 488 (7th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 967 (1973) (property interest found);
Weathers v. West Yuma County School Dist. R-J-1, 387 F. Supp. 552 (D. Col. 1974) (no
property interest).
To prove a liberty interest a non-tenured teacher must show his standing and associations
in the community have been seriously damaged or that his freedom to find employment
opportunities has been foreclosed. Teachers have been very unsuccessful in proving an infringement of their liberty interests. See, e.g., Ortwein v. Mackey, 511 F.2d 696 (5th Cir. 1975)
(no infringement of liberty interest if charges are true and kept in confidential files); Buhr v.
Buffalo Public School Dist. No. 38, 509 F.2d 1196 (8th Cir. 1974) (liberty interest not infringed
if reasons for dismissal are not announced publicly or put into record for prospective employers); Weathers v. West Yuma County School Dist. R-J-1, 387 F. Supp. 552 (D. Col. 1974)
(damage to liberty interest not sufficient to merit due process protection). But see Wilderman
v. Nelson, 467 F.2d 1173, 1176 (8th Cir. 1972); Johnson v. Fraley, 470 F.2d 179 (4th Cir. 1972).
Will Goss affect the manner in which courts analyze non-tenured teacher dismissals?
Arguably it should, but probably it will not. As long as the school administrators do not make
public charges or put damaging information into public files, the courts seem unwilling to
find an infringement of a teacher's liberty interest. Furthermore, at least one court has
determined that although there was some damage to plaintiffs reputation, it was not serious
enought to merit protection. Weathers v. West Yuma County School Dist. R-J-1, 387 F. Supp.
at 560. In general, the courts appear unwilling to look beyond the lack of specific charges to
the real harm suffered by a teacher who is given no reason for dismissal. Although the Goss
Court may have ventured into school affairs, other courts clearly have a hands-off policy:
It would be intolerable for the courts to interject themselves and to require an
educational institution to hire or to maintain on its staff a professor. . . whom it
deemed undesirable and did not wish to employ.
Frazier v. Curators of University of Missouri, 495 F.2d 1149, 1153 (8th Cir. 1974). For discussion of the due process rights of teachers in Illinois, see Kalleh, The Roth Decision: Does the
Nontenured Teacher Have a Constitutional Right to a Hearing before Nonrenewal?, 61 ILL.
B. J. 464 (1973); Keenan, CurrentIssues in Illinois School Law: The Consumer's Perspective,
23 DEPAUL L. REV. 402, 434-39 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Current Issues].
58. Interview with Saul Wexler, attorney for the Illinois Education Association, in Evanston, Illinois, August 31, 1975.
59. See, e.g., Sims v. Fox, 505 F.2d 857 (5th Cir. 1974), where a reserve officer sought a
hearing prior to a discharge, precipitated by his having pleaded nolo contendere to charges
of indecent exposure. The Fifth Circuit, at a rehearing en banc, held, inter alia, that the
officer's liberty interest had not been infringed by "the mere presence of derogatory information in confidential files and the government had not infringed 'liberty' unless it perpetuates
untrue charges." Id. at 864. The dissent took strong issue not only with whether the files were
truly confidential, but also as to what the real purpose of a due process hearing should be.
Although this latter aspect is frequently not mentioned in court opinions, it can be important.
See the discussion of functional appropriateness of procedures in Interest Balancing, supra
note 44, at 1514-22.
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The second step of the Roth analysis involves balancing the interest of the individual against that of the state in order to decide what
process is due. Since Goss makes clear that every government deprivation of a liberty or property interest which is not de minimis
triggers due process protection, this second step may become crucial
as courts and governments struggle to comply with due process
requirements." The problem with interest balancing, as illustrated
in Goss, is that "the concept of 'weight' employed in the interestbalancing doctrine is of such a subjective and ambiguous nature
that use of interest balancing necessarily occasions great uncertainty."6 The weight which Justice Powell gave the students' interest in avoiding an unfair suspension was obviously minimal;13 however, the majority found suspension could be "a serious event in the
life of the suspended child."" The gap between the majority and
dissenting opinions reflects society's ambivalence toward the role of
schools, the place of a child, and the importance of discipline.65
Given the fact that strongly held beliefs come into conflict during
the process of interest balancing, it is not surprising that the procedures required by the Goss Court are vague enough to cause problems.
DUE PROCESS PROCEDURES REQUIRED

By Goss

The Goss Court failed to specify the mildest form of suspension
which would invoke due process 6 and only generally described the
type of notice and hearing required. 7 This lack of specificity should
not generate major problems." However, the Court's statement of
60. For a thorough discussion of problems raised by the judicial use of interest balancing,
see generally Interest Balancing, supra note 44.
61. Id. at 1520-21.
62. Id. at 1519. Uncertainty, in turn, leads to litigation.
63. 419 U.S. at 598 n.19. Justice Powell's view of suspension may well have been occasioned by his experience as a school board member. See Heckinger, Due Process for the
Unruly Student, SATURDAY REVIEW (April 5, 1975) [hereinafter cited as Heckinger].
64. 419 U.S. at 576.
65. See generally Heckinger, supra note 63; C. SILBERMAN, CRISIS IN THE CLASSROOM 10
(1970).
66. 419 U.S. at 585 n.3.
67. Id. at 582. However, the fact that the Court does not require notification of parents
seems to devalue the role parents could play in alleviating discipline problems in schools. If
more parents were concerned about their child's activities, schools and society might have
fewer problems. See EVANSTON REvIEw, August 28, 1975, at 32. See also Developments, supra
note 1 at 1016-19, where the author discusses the possible problems in meeting the Goss
Court's requirements of effective notice and meaningful hearing.
68. See supra note 24; see also Developments, supra note 1.
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the situations where immediate removal without prior notice and
hearing will be sanctioned69 may prove troublesome. In Hubel v.
West Virginia Racing Commission,70 the court employed the Goss
Court's phrase "continuing danger" to justify a forty-seven day suspension of a racetrack owner-trainer's license.7 The Racing Commission did not deny that the license was a protected property interest. The issue rather was whether the suspension without prior hearing was justified. "We think it is," the court concluded "because an
owner-trainer in Hubel's position presents the same kind of 'continuing danger' which concerned. . . the Supreme Court in Goss."72
The "continuing danger" was that unless the owner-trainer was
suspended until the investigative board made a decision on the
alleged charges, he might repeat his alleged offense, the intentional
or negligent drugging of a horse. It is doubtful that the Supreme
Court would accept the rationale in this case to justify a long delay
between suspension and hearing, particularly since the owner disputed the charges. Although Goss did state that in cases of immediate suspension, a hearing should follow "as soon as practicable," 7 3
the Court also referred to the district court's ruling in Goss, which
allowed seventy-two hours after suspension.7 4
The Goss Court's phrase "ongoing threat of disrupting the academic process"75 may also create problems. The difficulty is that all
teachers and administrators do not view the same behavior as disruptive.7 6 In Hawkins v. Coleman,77 black student plaintiffs alleged,
inter alia, that the school's suspension policy was being administered in a racially discriminatory manner. Two experts testified.
One found that "there was a substantial reliance upon non-violent
'offenses' as a justification for suspension when, in fact, such conduct may be a pivotal ethnic characteristic."" The second expert
69. See text accompanying note 2 supra.
70. 513 F.2d 240
71. Id. at 243.
72. Id.
73. 419 U.S. at 583.
74. 372 F. Supp. 1270, 1302 (S.D. Ohio 1973).
75. 419 U.S. at 582.
76. See generally Ladd, Allegedly Disruptive Student Behavior and the Legal Authority
of School Officials, 19 J. Pus. LAW 209 (1970). Furthermore, some studies have shown that
teachers will view as disruptive the students whose behavior "interfers with their programs,
their ideals, and their beliefs." McClung, The Problem of the Due Process Exclusion: Do
Schools Have a Continuing Responsibility to Educate Children with Behavior Problems?, 3
J. LAW-ED. 491, 518 (1974) [hereinafter cited as McClung].
77. 376 F. Supp. 1330 (N.D. Tex. 1974).
78. Id. at 1336.
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concluded that in schools where there is institutional racism79
toward Blacks,
conduct by black students that would not be "unusual" or "offensive" in a black environment becomes to many teachers
"disruptive" or "suspendable conduct." To teachers unfamiliar
with Blacks, this conduct, that is non-violent and characteristic of
the black race, stands out and becomes thereby subject to selective
prosecution. 0
The qualification that the disruption constitute an "ongoing threat"'
may not provide much protection to the student suspended without
a hearing. If some form of racism is responsible for the teacher's view
that certain behavior is disruptive, then that same racism may trigger a feeling that the disruption presents an "ongoing threat." Furthermore, the phrase is susceptible to the same kind of judicial
reasoning as "continuing danger."'"
Students whose behavior is viewed as so disruptive as to constitute an "ongoing threat" may be subject not only to immediate
suspension, but also to removal from the school environment to
some sort of "Extension School.""2 The possibility that such a transfer will stigmatize the student and result in an inferior education,
"thus leading to more limited life choices,""3 cannot be disregarded.
The Goss Court's choice of phrasing is particularly unfortunate,
given the disagreement among educators as to what constitutes and
79.

"Institutional racism" exists ... when the standard operating procedures of an
institution are prejudiced against, derogatory to, or unresponsive to the needs of a
particular racial group.

Id.
80. Id.
81. See text accompanying notes 70 through 74 supra. However, one commentator has
suggested that Laine v. Dittman, 125 Il. App. 2d 136, 259 N.E.2d 824 (1970), may provide
authority for the proposition that the determination of whether a student's behavior is disruptive "must be made objectively, not by an excitable dean of discipline." CurrentIssues, supra
note 57, at 417. Laine involved the suspension of a male student because the length of his
hair did not conform to standards set out in a Grooming Code.
82. One way to reduce the number of suspensions is to remove problem-prone
students from the school environment which, for some students, contains too many
temptations that lead to suspension-causing difficulties. One successful alternative
environment is our Extension School.
Evanston Township High School, Report of the Committee on Student Suspension, December, 1974.
83. Kirp, Buss and Kuriloff, Legal Reform of Special Education: Empirical Studies and
ProceduralProposals, 62 CAL. L. REv. 40, 119 (1974). Limiting a child's choices in life by
providing an inferior education raises the issue of whether schools must provide an effective
education. See note 115 infra. See also 9 CLEMINGHOUSE REV. 259, 260 (Aug. 1975) for recent
developments in cases where exceptional or handicapped children alleged a denial of due
process in various classification or transfer programs.
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causes disruptive behavior. 4
INTO THE THICKET

Justice Powell gloomily predicted: "[n]o one can foresee the ultimate frontiers of the new 'thicket' the Court now enters."" 5 While
Goss has been cited in several decisions since it came down,86 these
decisions give no clear signals that a tempest is brewing. s7 Yet,
84. See note 76 supra.
85. 419 U.S. at 597.
86. See note 87 infra.
87. In United States v. Watts, 513 F.2d 5, 8 (10th Cir. 1975), Goss was cited for the
proposition that due process is a flexible concept and must be administered in a manner
applicable to the particular situation. This is hardly a novel or immoderate statement. The
Watts case involved a juvenile who sought appeal of a decision finding him guilty of involuntary manslaughter and adjudging him a delinquent. He argued that because the express
provisions of In Re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967), had not been met, he had been denied due
process. The court held that although there had been a "technical" violation, the fact that
the youth had himself had notice, had been represented by counsel, and had been aided by
his parents in his defense and at trial showed he had been accorded due process.
In Ammond v. McGahn, 390 F. Supp. 655 (D.N.J. 1975), a member of the New Jersey
Senate sued because she had been excluded from her party's caucus for making public critical
remarks. The court held that such exclusion, done without a prior hearing, violated due
process. Although the court did not discuss whether the plaintiff had a property or liberty
interest, it could be assumed that both were present. Plaintiff would have a property interest
in her entitlement to her job as state senator for a specified term. The exclusion from her
party's caucus, which decides the course of legislation before it reaches the Senate floor, could
arguably infringe her liberty interest in her reputation by stigmatizing her in the community
of senate members.
Goss has also been cited in Rolles v. Civil Service Commission, 512 F.2d 1319, 1326 (D.C.
Cir. 1975), to support the proposition that when a person's liberty interest is infringed by
charges of dishonesty, a hearing prior to dismissal must be held to afford the alleged offender
a chance to refute the charges. The infringement of plaintiff's liberty interest seems clear in
this case. He had been charged with falsifying a voucher and diverting an Air Force plane to
Andrews Air Force Base for his personal use. Furthermore, he had a property interest in his
civil service job, an interest recognized by six justices in Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134
(1974).
In Eley v. Morris, 390 F. Supp. 913, 924 (N.D. Ga. 1975), the court, in dealing with the
second step of due process adjudication, the balancing of interests, followed Goss in finding
that except in unusual cases, the interest of the individual in preventing a termination based
on unfair or mistaken reasons outweighed any administrative burden placed on the government. Two former government employees were terminated according to regulations which
provided for notice of dismissal and a post-termination hearing, but gave no right to a list of
specific charges or an opportunity to refute the charges. After reviewing Goss, the court found:
"the implication of the public employee cases and the express holding of Goss v. Lopez is
that some due process protections should be deemed applicable to the initial stages of the
discharge procedure." 390 F. Supp. at 923. The pre-termination procedures required by the
court were a list of charges and an opportunity to refute the charges, in writing and supported
by affidavits, before a state official with authority over the employee's supervisor. Id. at 924.
These procedures illustrate what the Goss court had indicated: that the seriousness of the
deprivation is a factor in determining what process is due. That more formal procedures were
required in Eley than in Goss comports with the seriousness of the deprivation, the termination of employment.
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however moderate these few post-Goss decisions appear, the thicket
has been entered. in a recent case, Daliam v. Cumberland Valley
School District,8 the issue before the district court was "whether the
constitutional protection afforded public school students in Goss v.
Lopez - extends to the extra-curricular activity of interscholastic
athletics.""8 The court recognized that this issue was one anticipated by Justice Powell's dissent; however, the court was able to
distinguish the interests recognized in Goss from that claimed by
the plaintiff. The analysis the Dallam court employed to distinguish
Goss may indicate how other courts will attempt to avoid entanglement in the thicket. Although apparently confused by the Goss
Court's analysis of protected interest, 0 the court concluded:
Despite the dualty of Goss's langugage, this court views the case
to stand for the proposition that once the state transforms a privilege into a property interest, no matter what its weight, due process attaches.'
The court then reasoned that the companion case to Goss, Wood v.
Strickland,2 "dictates that the plaintiff have a 'specific' property
interest in interscholastic high school competition." 3
Goss had spoken of the "property interest in educational benefits," and the court conceded that interscholastic athletics could
be a benefit of education. However, since Goss also spoke in terms
of a "total exclusion from the educational process,"" the court reasoned that a property interest was created only in "participation in
the entire process."" All activities "combine to form that educa88. 391 F. Supp. 358 (M.D. Pa. 1975).
89. Id. at 359. The plaintiff sought to enjoin a rule which automatically barred for one
year any student who transferred school districts from participating in interscholastic athletics. The rule allowed no hearing in which the student might prove that he transferred school
districts not for athletic purposes but for scholastic reasons.
90. But Goss speaks in two ways. First, the Court repeatedly speaks of the serious
damage to the plaintiff's reputation ....
Second, the Court speaks in terms of the
nature of the interest and not its weight.
391 F. Supp. at 360; see text accompanying notes 41 through 49 supra.
91. 391 F. Supp. at 361.
92. 420 U.S. 308 (1975).
93. 391 F. Supp. at 361. The court reaches this conclusion from the following language in
Wood:

§ 1983 was not intended to be a vehicle for federal court correction of errors in the
exercise of that discretion which do not rise to the level of violations of specific
constitutional guarantees.
420 U.S. at 326.
94. 419 U.S. at 576.
95. 391 F. Supp. at 361.
96.

Id.
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tional process." 7 Therefore, since the plaintiff did not have a property interest,8 he did not have a right, privilege, or immunity that
had been deprived by state action." Finding itself without subject
matter jurisdiction, the court dismissed the case.
The decision in Dallam will not prevent future litigation based on
Goss. First, it is significant that the plaintiff in Dallam did not
argue his liberty interest. The psychological evidence which Justice
Powell found particularly speculative, 0 0 related to the students' liberty interest. Therefore, it is arguable that the plaintiff in Dallam
might have prevailed had he shown that by denying him a year of
interscholastic athletics, his opportunity to attend college was hampered,' 0 1 his self-esteem was damaged, or the unfair treatment afforded him led to suspicion and resentment. 02 Furthermore, there
is pre-Goss precedent that interscholastic athletics is such a valuable interest that it deserves due process protection. 3 Such precedent argues against the court's statement that even if a property
interest did exist, it would be de minimis.104
There are other conceivable ramifications of Goss. Justice Powell's dissent in Wood v. Strickland,'"° the companion case to Goss,
raises a serious question. Wood held:
[I]n the specific context of school discipline . ..a school board
member is not immune from liability for damages under § 1983 if
he knew or reasonably should have known that the action he took
within his sphere of official responsibility would violate the consti97. Id.
98. It appears plaintiff did not argue a liberty interest.
99. 391 F. Supp. at 359. Defendants had moved for dismissal for lack of federal jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C §1983 requires a plaintiff to show that the defendant has deprived him of a
right, privilege or immunity guaranteed by the Constitution or laws of the United States. See
note 10 supra.
100. 419 U.S. at 589.
101. This argument might depend upon whether plaintiff's skills could qualify him for an
athletic scholarship.
102. See note 56 supra.
103. See Kelley v. Metropolitan County Bd. of Ed. of Nashville and Davidson County,
Tenn., 293 F. Supp. 485, 492-93 (M.D. Tenn. 1968). Although this case is pre-Roth and
therefore was decided on the basis of the significance of the interest, the case relied on by
the Dallam court is also pre.Roth. See 391 F. Supp. at 361.
104. 391 F. Supp. at 362 n.5.
105. 420 U.S. 308 (1975). In Wood three sixteen year old girls admitted mixing three
bottles of 3.2 beer into a punch to be served at a school function. The girls admitted spiking
the punch. The board initially held, at a meeting to which neither the students nor their
parents were invited, that the students would be suspended for the remainder of the year, a
period of three months. At a later meeting, at which the students were represented, the board
affirmed its decision. The district court held the school board was immune from damages,
but the appellate court reversed, finding the board's failure to present evidence that the
punch was "intoxicating" violated the students' constitutional rights."
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tutional rights of the student affected.' 6

The board member is held responsible for knowing only "settled
indisputable law" and "unquestioned constitutional rights."', 7 As
Justice Powell recognized, such vague requirements could mean
that school officials, who acted in good faith, only to have it judicially determined later that they had violated some student's
"unquestioned constitutional right" would be liable for damages.'0
Furthermore, when Wood is read in conjunction with Goss, one
must ask whether such school official's decisions as the immediate
suspension of a student deemed disruptive,'" 9 or the placement of a
student in a non-honors track, without providing him a hearing,
would make the official liable for damages." '0
One aspect seemingly overlooked by Goss is whether suspension,
as a disciplinary tool, works. The majority opinion found it a "valuable educational device;""' the dissent found suspension a routine
tool of discipline, which "is an integral and important part of training our children to be good citizens.""1'2 School committees may find
suspension "an effective corrective measure for misconduct." ' Yet
106. 420 U.S. at 322. Wood thus appears to limit the qualified immunity for officials
acting in good faith which it recognized last term in Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 247-48
(1974). See also McLaughlin v. Tilendis, 398 F.2d 287, 290-91 (7th Cir. 1968) in which the
court held that the Illinois Tort Immunity Act gives only qualified immunity, dependent upon
good faith action, to school superintendent and board members sued under 28 U.S.C. § 1983.
107. 420 U.S. at 329. (Powell, J., dissenting).
108. 420 U.S. at 328.
109. See text accompanying notes 75 through 84 supra.
110. 420 U.S. 329 n.3. One commentator has noted a possible beneficial aspect of Wood:
[T]he liability for damages assigned to board members by Wood has already been
held to apply to principals and teachers, who are never accorded immunity as
public officials. To the extent, therefore, that the Wood case makes school boards
more cautious in the adoption of regulations which principals must administer-it
may help keep principals out of court.
Memo, supra note 6, at 6. Furthermore, the commentator noted that the Supreme Court ruled
unanimously that the court of appeals should not have interfered with the school board's
interpretation of the applicable school rule. That the Supreme Court intends to limit the
scope of judicial review is clear from Justice White's opinion:
It is not the rule of the federal courts to set aside decision of school administrators
which the court may view as lacking a basis in wisdom or compassion. . . . The
system of public education that has evolved in this Nation relies necessarily upon
the discretion and judgment of school administrators and school board members,
and § 1983 was not intended to be a vehicle for federal court correction of errors in
the exercise of that discretion which do not rise to the level of violations of specific
constitutional guarantees.
420 U.S. at 326.
111. 419 U.S. at 580.
112. Id. at 593, quoting Tinker v. Des Moines Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 524
(1969).
113. Evanston Township High School, Report of the Committee on Student Suspensions,
December, 1974, at 3.
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some critics suggest that rarely does suspension help a student in
any positive way."' For the Court to do more than give some settled
platitudes about the need for discipline would force it to confront
the really difficult question: why do schools have so many discipline
problems?
Finally, one of the most intriguing aspects of Goss is whether it
can be expanded to support a student's right to an effective education." 5 Does a student have a right not only to attend school, but
also to be taught certain skills there? Are schools accountable for
the product they turn out? If Goss can support the student's right
to an effective education, then the case will indeed create a tempest.
To read Charles Silberman's description of a typical school"' makes
one ponder whether the Goss Court's intrusion into school affairs is
the first step toward a more difficult decision that the Court will one
day face.
THE IMPACT OF

Goss

IN ILLINOIS"

7

Goss has led to some changes in Illinois school adminstration and
is likely to cause more." 8 The Illinois School Code, which authorizes
school boards to suspend or expel students guilty of "gross disobedi1 9 is very similar to the Ohio statute found
ence or misconduct,""
114.
115.
(1975).

See McClung, supra note 76, at 516-27.
Comment, Tort Liability for Failure to Educate, 6 LOYOLA U. CHI. L. REv. 462, 481

116. C. SIL

A.uN,CRmSIS IN THE CLASSROOM 10 (1970):
"The most deadly of all possible sins.., is the mutilation of a child's spirit." It is
not possible to spend any prolonged period visiting public school classrooms without being appalled by the mutilation visible everywhere - mutilation of spontaneity,
of joy in learning, of pleasure in creating, of sense of self. . . .Because adults take
the schools so much for granted, they fail to appreciate what grim, joyless places
most American schools are, how oppressive and petty are the rules . . .. how
intellectually sterile and esthetically barren the atmosphere, what an appalling lack
of civility obtains on the part of teachers and principals, what contempt they
unconsciously display for children as children.
117. For a thorough discussion of Illinois school law, see CurrentIssues, supra note 57.
118. See note 127 infra.
119. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 122, § 10-22.6 (a)(b)(c) (1973), reads:
Suspension or expulsion of pupils. (a) To expel pupils guilty of gross disobedience
or misconduct, and no action shall lie against them for such expulsion. Expulsion
shall take place only after the parents have been requested to appear at a meeting
of the board, or with a hearing officer appointed by it, to discuss their child's
behavior. Such request shall be made by registered or certified mail and shall state
the time, place and purpose of the meeting. The board, or a hearing officer appointed by it, at such meeting shall state the reasons for dismissal and the date on
which the expulsion is to become effective. If a hearing officer is appointed by the
board he shall report to the board a written summary of the evidence heard at the
meeting and the board may take such action thereon as it finds appropriate.
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unconstitutional in Goss.'2 ° Three years before Goss a student had
challenged the provisions of section 10-22.6 of the Illinois School
Code, which allowed his suspension for seven days without affording
him a prior hearing or giving him a chance to speak in his own
behalf. 2' In Linwood v. Board of Education, the court found that a
seven day suspension was a "minor disciplinary penalty which the
legislature may elect to treat differently from expulsion or prolonged
suspension without violating a constitutional right of the student.' ' 2 2 The classification of a seven day suspension as a minor

penalty which requires no due process will no longer be tolerated.
Since the Illinois School Code mandates no notice or hearing prior
to suspension, it is fatally flawed. Furthermore, the notice following
suspension for which the Code does provide is directed to the
par(b) To suspend or by regulation to authorize the superintendent of the district
or the principal or dean of students of any school to suspend pupils guilty of gross

disobedience or misconduct and no action shall lie against them for such suspension. The board may by regulation authorize the superintendent of the district or
the principal of any school to suspend pupils guilty of such acts for a period not to
exceed 10 school days. Any such suspension shall be reported immediately to the
parents or guardian of such pupil along with a full statement of the reasons for such
suspension and a notice of their right to a review, a copy of which shall be given to
the school board. Upon request of the parents or guardian the school board or a
hearing officer appointed by it shall review such action of the superintendent or
principal At such review the parents or guardian of the pupil may appear and
discuss the suspension with the board or its hearing officer. If a hearing officer is
appointed by the board he shall report to the board a written summary of the
evidence heard at the meeting. After its hearing or upon receipt of the written report
of its hearing officer, the board may take such action as it finds appropriate.
(c) To suspend or by regulation to authorize the superintendent of the district
or the principal of any school to suspend pupils guilty of gross disobedience or
misconduct on the school bus from riding the school bus and no action shall lie
against them for such suspension. Such suspension shall continue until it has been
reviewed by the school board, or a hearing officer appointed by it. At such review
the parents or guardian of the child may appear and discuss such suspension with
the board or its hearing officer. If a hearing officer is appointed by the board he
shall report to the board a written summary of the evidence heard at the meeting.
The board may take such action thereon as it finds appropriate upon the board's
hearing or the written report of its hearing officer.
Subsection (d) of ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 122 § 10-22.6 (1973) provides:
(d) The Department of Mental Health shall be invited to send a representative
to consult with the board at such meeting whenever there is evidence that mental
illness may be the cause for expulsion or suspension.
As one commentator has noted, "To date no student has ever invited a DMH representative
to his expulsion proceeding on the theory that there is evidence that the cause for the expulsion or suspension is the mental illness of the school administrators or board members."
Current Issues, supra note 57, at 422 n.106.

120. See note 7 supra.
121. Linwood v. Board of Ed., City of Peoria, Sch. Dist. 150, Ill., 463 F.2d 763 (7th Cir.),
cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1027 (1972).
122. Id. at 768-69.
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ents or guardians of the pupil, not to the student himself, as Goss
dictates. 2 1 Whether or not local school boards will adopt procedures
in conformity with Goss remains to be seen." 4
Students in the Chicago public schools seem, at the moment, to
be the true beneficiaries of the Goss decision. The Chicago Board
of Education is governed by a special section of the School Code.'
This section gives the Board enormous power over the student, including, in the past, the power to suspend for one month, expel, or
transfer without providing for notice or hearing of any kind.' 26 However, the procedures governing suspension and expulsion from Chi123. 419 U.S. at 581.
124. The National Association of Secondary School Principals recommends the following
for short-term suspensions:
If nothing more is prescribed by statute or regulation, the Goss decision requires
before actual suspension:
a) oral or written notification of the nature of the violation and the intended
punishment
b) "discussion" with the disciplinarian providing the pupil with an opportunity to tell his side of the story
c) if the student denies the violation, an explanation of the evidence of the
violation upon which the disciplinarian is relying. (The interview may follow
by minutes the act which caused the reaction on the part of the school
official.) Memo, supra note 6, at 7.
Prior to Goss, the school board of Evanston Township High School directed the school
administration to revise suspension procedures, which had been criticized because the provision for appeal caused the appeal to follow, rather than precede, the suspension. Report of
the Committee on Student Suspension, supra note 4. The Committee recommended a revised
"Notification of Student Suspension" form, which provides, in most instances, for a delay in
the effective date of suspension, during which time a student's parent may appeal. The form
is set out in Appendix A infra. Although the new form employed at Evanston High School is
an improvement, it still has problems. There is no mention of any notice or hearing prior to
the decision to suspend. Further, it is the parent, not the student, who appears to have the
right to appeal. Finally, the school's assumption that the parent waives his right to a hearing
if he does not return the form within ten days may not meet due process requirements. See
Washington Students, supra note 1, at 678 n.19.
125. ILL. REv. STAT., ch. 122, § 34-1 et seq. (1973).
126. Rules of the Board of Education of the City of Chicago § 6.9. (1972) provided:
Suspension of Pupils-Cause. For gross disobedience or misconduct a pupil may be
suspended temporarily by the principal for a period not exceeding one school month
for each offense. Every such suspension shall be reported immediately to the District Superintendent and also to the parent or guardian of the pupil, with a full
statement of the reasons for such suspension. The District Superintendent shall
have authority to review the action of the principal and to return the suspended
pupil.
Id. § 6.8:
Expulsion of Pupils-Cause. Whenever a pupil in any school is found by the school
authorities to be a distinct detrimental influence to the conduct of the school, or
to be unable to profit or benefit from further experience in his school, he may be
transferred to special educational facilities in the school system or may be excused
from further attendance, or excluded from school by the General Superintendent
of Schools.
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cago public schools have been radically altered since Goss.127 Hopefully, the new procedures will provide Chicago public school students with sufficient protection against the attitudes of some school
officials."'
CONCLUSION

The Supreme Court's decision in Goss v. Lopez, although an unprecedented step into school affairs, is a baby step. Practically, the
kind of "truncated"' 2 9 due process required by the Court should
prove a minor burden on school administrators. However, the
Court's unwillingness to view realistically the infringement of a liberty interest in Roth, while finding a deprivation of a student's
liberty interest in Goss, leads to confusion. If the Court is going to
continue to follow the Roth analysis for due process adjudication,
it needs to clarify its treatment of the liberty interest and admit that
some balancing may be inevitable.
Goss has clarified the status of a student's right to a public education. It should end the conflict in the lower courts as to whether
short term suspensions qualify for due process protection. Nevertheless, the decision has raised questions. How those questions will be
answered may ultimately depend upon whether the Court retrenches after Goss or whether it continues to move cautiously into
the thicket of school affairs.
BRANNON HEATH
127. See new procedures listed in Appendix B infra.
Since the procedures are taken almost verbatim from Goss, they should prove satisfactory.
Furthermore, provision 5 under the rules for suspension goes a step beyond Goss.
128. See Current Issues supra note 57, at 423-25.
129. 419 U.S. at 596.

APPENDIX

A

SAMPLE SUSPENSION FORM
EVANSTON TOWNSHIP HIGH SCHOOL
1600 Dodge Avenue, Evanston, Illinois 60204
TO: THE PARENT/GUARDIAN OF
(student)

(school)

The Illinois School Code provides that a student may be suspended from school attendance for up to ten school days; the Code further provides that the parents of a suspended
student shall be notified immediately of the suspension, shall be informed of the reasons
for the action and of their right to a review before the Board of Education or its appointed
hearing officer. Pursuant to these statutory provisions, ETHS has adopted the following
procedures:
1.

Within 24 hours (one school day) of the decision to suspend, the suspending officer
attempts telephone notification to the student's home. Regardless of whether tele-
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phone contact is made, written notification is sent to the parent by certified mail or by
personal messenger within 48 hours (two school days).
2.

Ordinarily, the period of suspension begins on the third day following the decision to
suspend. The period of suspension may begin immediately if, in the informed judgment of the suspending officer, the removal of the student from the campus is necessary to the safety of persons or property or the reasonable orderliness of normal school
operations.

3.

The parent may, upon request within ten days of the date of the suspension, arrange
to have the suspension reviewed. To arrange for a review, the parent or the student
returns the appeal form (below) to the school office. Any remaining days of the suspension are, upon school receipt of the form, held in abeyance.

4.

If a review is requested, a review hearing is scheduled by the Board of Education
within thirty (30) days of the school's receipt of the form.
If a review is conducted, up to five witnesses may be called by either party; either party
may record the proceedings at its own expense; the hearing is held in executive (private) session; absence from the hearing by parent or student constitutes a waiver of
review; a written decision is issued within forty-eight (48) hours by the Board, which
decision is final; and, should the hearing result in the rescinding of the suspension, all
references to the suspension are expunged from the student's record; in addition, the
school assumes the initiative in arranging make-up work for the student.

5.

NOTIFICATION OF STUDENT SUSPENSION
I
, is to be suspended for
(name of student)
(school)
days because of the following behavior:
(number)
which occurred on
This behavior violated these school policies or
(date)
rules:
The suspension is to be in force during the inclusive dates of
the student is not to return to the school campus during this period for any reason other than
for specific appointments with school officials pursuant to this suspension. The student's
presence on the school campus for any other reason during this period renders the student
liable to the charge of criminal trespass.

(date of notice)

(signature of school official)
APPEAL FORM

If the parent wishes to appeal this suspension, the parent is urged to contact the
student's principal. If the parent desires a Board of Education hearing about this suspension,
the parent is requested to sign the signature blank (below) and return, or have the student
return the form to the student's school office within ten school days of the date of notice.
If the form is not returned within ten days, the school assumes a waiver of hearing. Should
a hearing be requested, the parent will be advised of the scheduled date.
I hereby request a Board hearing about this suspension.
Signature of parent
Date of request
Copy 1 to parent: copy 2 to school office: copy 3 to Central Office: copy 4 to Board.
form rev. 12/74
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Student Rights
APPENDIX

B

PROCEDURES FOR SUSPENSION AND
EXPULSION OF PUPILS FROM CHICAGO PUBLIC SCHOOLS
RECOMMENDATION:

The following guidelines establish administrative procedures
for the suspension and expulsion of pupils.
Section A: Guidelines for the suspension of pupils from school.
Principals are to follow the guidelines below when
suspending students from school.
1. No student shall be suspended from school without using
the authorized procedures. Every suspension shall be reported immediately to the District Superintendent using the
appropriate forms and also reported to the parent or guardian
of the pupil with a full statement of the reasons for the supension.
2. A student facing suspension of ten days or less shall be given oral or written notice of the charges against him and an
informal hearing arranged by the principal. At the hearing, the
student will be given an explanation of the basis of the charges
as well as an opportunity to present his version of the facts.
3. A student facing suspension may request that a third party
-such as a parent, school staff member or another student
be present during the informal hearing.
4. In those cases where a student's presence poses a continuing danger to persons or property or is an ongoing threat of
disrupting the academic process, the student may be immediately removed from school. In such cases the necessary notice
and informal hearing should follow as soon as practicable.
5. Every effort should be made to ensure the student's receipt
of class assignments for the period of the suspension. The
academic grade of a suspended student will not be affected
when class assignments are completed satisfactorily in keeping
with standards applicable to all students set by the student's
teacher. Teachers have the further option of testing pupils
upon their return to class on the work submitted.
Section B:
school.

Guidelines for the expulsion of students from

1. Before a student is expelled from school the principal shall
submit a written request to the District Superintendent for
an expulsion hearing. The District Superintendent shall refer
the matter to the Hearing Officer assigned to his Area.
2. The Hearing Officer will notify the parent or guardian of a
student facing expulsion, using registered or certified mail,
of a hearing to discuss their child's behavior. The notification
shall state time, place and purpose of the meeting.
3. The Hearing Officer shall also inform the parent or guardian
of the student's right to secure counsel, to confront and
cross examine witnesses and to call his own witnesses. Said
hearings will be as private as possible, therefore, only those
persons directly involved may be present.
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4. Within three weeks after the conclusion of the hearing, the
Hearing Officer shall present a written summary of the
evidence together with his findings and recommendations and
a tape recording of the hearing to the District Superintendent.
If the Hearing Officer recommends that the pupil be expelled, he shall state the reasons for his decision and the date
upon which the expulsion is to become effective.
5. The District Siperintendent will review the record of the
Hearing Officer and promptly notify the parent of his determination.

SUPPORTIVE DATA:

Amendments to Sections 6-8 and 6-9 of the Rules of the Board
of Education dealing respectively with expulsion and suspension of students will be most effectively implemented with
the adoption of these guidelines.

FINANCIAL:

Additional cost will be reflected in the Board Report Establishing Hearing Officer Position.

